How people resolve their individual interests with those of the groups they belong to is a critical question in the social sciences (Hardin 1982; Horne 2009; Olson 1965) . In collective action problems, what is best for the individual is in conflict with what is best for the group, yet if all pursue their own self-interest, the group as a whole is worse off (Heckathorn 1996; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Willer 2009 ). As Kollock (1998) notes, collective action problems are a ubiquitous part of social life, ranging from everyday problems such as productivity in work groups to global efforts to combat climate change. Since Ames (1979, 1980) , social scientists have studied contributions to non-excludable public goods as the quintessential collective action problem, given that self-interested individuals would prefer to free-ride on public goods produced by others than to bear the costs of contributing themselves (Olson 1965) .
One widely researched solution to collective action problems is the introduction of sanctions. Allowing for the punishment or reward of group members may reduce the tension between individual and group goals by making free-riding, or not contributing, less attractive (Heckathorn 1989; Macy 1993) . Indeed, much past work has shown that people are willing to expend valuable resources to punish free-riders, and this effectively increases public good contributions (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; Yamagishi 1986 ).
The prevailing model of sanctions in the experimental literature on collective action is peer sanctioning, where each group member can punish every other group member (Shinada and Yamagishi 2007) . Peer-punishment systems can increase contributions to collective efforts, but they also have a number of critical drawbacks. First, there are often significant costs associated with contributing to the provision or maintenance of a sanctioning system (Kollock 1998) . Indeed, a sanctioning system is itself a public good (Heckathorn 1989; Oliver 1980 ) and, as a result, can pose a "second-order free-rider problem," such that group members may be motivated to enjoy the fruits of sanctions (the resultant increase in group contributions) without bearing the costs of providing them (Heckathorn 1989; Oliver 1980) . The difficulty of coordinating peer punishment can also result in over-punishment when group members "pile on" a free-rider, meting out a punishment that outweighs the offense (Nosenzo and Sefton 2014) . Relatedly, the costs of sanctions sometimes exceed the benefits of increased cooperation, thus reducing overall welfare (Dreber et al. 2008 ). Finally, the potential for retaliatory acts of counter-punishment can increase negative emotions and decrease contributions to the public good (Nikiforakis 2008) .
Compared to peer-sanctioning systems, institutions in which a single person is responsible for punishment are less subject to coordination problems, over-punishment, and the associated earnings losses (Eriksson, Strimling, and Ehn 2013; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012) . Just as importantly, sanctioning capacity in many real-world groups is centralized in a single individual or role-occupant, rather than distributed equally among all group members (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Ostrom 2000) . Thus, not only is there is a mismatch between the sanctioning institutions we tend to observe in the real world, which generally limit who can sanction whom, and the standard solution proffered by the literature; some evidence suggests that the solution more commonly observed in real-world groups may be the more effective one. 1 Several studies have shown that designating a group leader-in these studies, a single individual able to monitor group members' behavior and administer punishment-can promote collective action (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015; Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999 ). Yet, in each of these studies, the leader was either completely external to the group or, once the leader had been selected from among the group members, they no longer made contributions and thus had no vested interest in the collective good. Therefore, prior studies have not addressed whether and how group leaders' own contribution behaviors change after receiving the leader position; nor have they shown whether and how leaders' contributions influence the contributions of rank-and-file members. Finally, no studies have addressed how groups in which the capacity to sanction is given to a single group member fare relative to the standard solution in the literature, where sanctioning capacity is equally distributed among all group members. Our research aims to address these issues. 2 In the sections to follow, we integrate insights from the literatures on collective action, power, and influence to address how and when leadership can help solve collective action problems. After describing our conceptualization of leadership, we argue that prosocial, or other-regarding, group leaders will lead for the benefit of their groups, whereas proself-(self-regarding) led groups, on the whole, will be worse off. Perhaps more importantly, we address why prosocial leaders are so effective, showing how, via the exercise of power and influence, they establish norms of high cooperation among members of the rank and file. In addition, we argue that the benefits of prosocial leadership exceed those provided by the standard solution to collective action problems, where ability to punish is distributed equally among group members.
Group Leadership and Power
There are many different forms-and definitions-of leadership (Bass and Bass 2009) . But the literature generally defines leaders as those who use various tools-most commonly, power and influence-to induce rank-and-file members to produce desired outcomes (Ahlquist and Levi 2011; Bass and Bass 2009) . Effective use of these tools can facilitate group interaction and group goals, producing benefits to both leaders and their followers (Ahlquist and Levi 2011) .
Key to our conception of leadership is that leaders possess disproportionate power over rank-and-file members (Anderson and Brown 2010; Bass and Bass 2009; French and Raven 1959) . Since Weber (1947) , sociologists and social psychologists have conceived of power as the ability of an individual to impose their will on others via their control over valuable resources (Cook and Emerson 1978; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1987; Sell et al. 2004) . Following Weber, sociological work has focused on power as the capacity to reward (Molm 1988 (Molm , 1990 and punish (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Molm 1988 Molm , 1990 Ostrom et al. 1992; Sell and Wilson 1999; Yamagishi 1986 ). Following the literature on which we build (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015; Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999) , we focus specifically on leaders whose power is based on their ability to punish others. Our focus on leaders who can punish-versus reward-facilitates comparisons with peer-sanctioning systems which, with very few exceptions, focus on punishment (see Shinada and Yamagishi [2007] for a review).
Because leadership typically entails disproportionate power over others (Anderson and Brown 2010; Bass and Bass 2009) , it is important to know whether and how those who move into leadership positions are affected by power. One line of research holds that power corrupts (Bass and Bass 2009; Kipnis 1972) . For instance, compared to their less powerful counterparts, the powerful tend to be more attentive to rewards, and construe others as a means to attain rewards (Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003) . Similarly, power reduces individuals' ability to accurately perceive others and the relations between them (Simpson, Markovsky, and Steketee 2011) , as well as perspective-taking (Galinsky et al. 2006) .
Other work suggests a substantially more nuanced view of how power impacts those who possess it (Blader and Chen 2012; Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh 2001; DeCelles et al. 2012) . Person x situation approaches argue that power accentuates baseline dispositions, such that those with other-regarding preferences will become more other-regarding when they acquire power, while those with more self-regarding preferences become more self-regarding than they were before they obtained power (Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh 2001) .
In the following section, we apply a person x situation approach to the problem of leadership in collective action groups. Specifically, we suggest that an individual's social value orientation will moderate how the acquisition of a leadership position-here, having the sole ability to sanction group members-affects her behavior. Perhaps more importantly, we address how these behaviors impact rank-and-file members' behaviors, and the success of collective action groups as a whole, via both power and influence processes (Thye, Willer, and Markovsky 2006; Willer, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997) .
A Person x Situation Approach to Leadership, Power, and Collective Action
A number of studies in sociology, social psychology, and behavioral economics have addressed the role of different social preferences in explaining variation in cooperative behavior (e.g., Fehr and Gintis 2007; Ones and Putterman 2007; Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 2007; Yamagishi et al. 2013) . One of the most powerful person-level predictors of behaviors in collective action situations is an individual's social value orientation, defined as a relatively stable preference for how valuable outcomes are distributed between oneself and others (Kollock 1998) . Although many social value orientations are theoretically possible, researchers generally focus on individualists, competitors, and prosocials ( Van Lange et al. 1997) . Individualists seek to maximize their own outcomes with less regard for the outcomes of others. Competitors seek to maximize the difference between own and others' outcomes. Compared to these two "proself" value orientations, prosocials tend to maximize joint outcomes and to minimize differences between own and others' outcomes ( Van Lange et al. 1997) . Social value orientation is predictive of a wide range of prosocial behaviors-compared to proselfs (both individualists and competitors), prosocials donate more to charity (Van Lange et al. 2007 ) and contribute more in collective action situations (Balliet, Parks, and Joireman 2009) .
We are interested in how prosocials and proselfs respond to leadership positions, and how their behaviors as leaders impact contribution norms and the behaviors of rank-and-file group members. Specifically, we expect that proselfs given a leadership role will reduce their contributions to the public good, such that they will contribute less when they ascend to a leadership position. On the other hand, prosocial leaders contribute more when they become leaders.
For example, a relatively prosocial leader of a work group might take on a disproportionate share of the work on a given task. On the other hand, a proself leader would be more apt to free-ride on the efforts of his or her subordinates.
Importantly, we predict that these effects will occur above and beyond baseline differences in contributions between prosocials and proselfs. After all, prosocials are generally more cooperative than proselfs under situations of equal power (see Balliet, Parks, and Joireman [2009] for a review). But following Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh (2001), we expect that the acquisition of power will magnify these baseline tendencies in the power holder. That is, proself individuals will become even more self-regarding when they get power, while prosocials will become even more group-oriented. We refer to changes in contributions as a result of obtaining power as first-order effects of power. As shown in the theoretical model given in figure 1 , we predict that first-order power effects will be moderated by whether the power holder is prosocial or proself. (In the next section, we distinguish these first-order effects from second-order power effects, or the differential exercise of power by the leader over the rank and file.)
More important, however, is how leaders shape group-level outcomes by impacting others' behavior. In the next section, we address two routes through which prosocials might promote the welfare of the groups they lead: influence and power.
Leader Impact on Group-Level Outcomes: Two Possible Routes
Besides enhanced power, leaders normally enjoy greater influence in groups (Anderson and Brown 2010; Lucas 2003) . Whereas power entails the ability to impose one's will on others via control over resources, influence involves modifying others' behavior without the use of sanctions, for example, via persuasion, information, or advice (Willer, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997; Willer, Troyer, and Lovaglia 2005) . A long tradition of research in sociology connects standing in status hierarchies to disproportionate influence over other group members (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway 2001) ; some of this work has focused specifically on the influence enjoyed by group leaders (e.g., Lucas 2003) .
Several studies have addressed the role of status-based influence in collective action groups (Clark, Clark, and Polborn 2006; Sell 1997; Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway 2012; Willer 2009 ). These studies find that higher-status group members initiate contributions to their groups and influence others to give at higher levels than they would otherwise, thus establishing cooperative norms over time. Because group leaders are more salient than non-leaders and serve as a focal point to other members (Ahlquist and Levi 2011) , we suggest that non-leaders will focus especially on leaders' contributions when making their own contribution decisions. That is, we expect leaders' contributions will play a larger role in the emergence of cooperative norms-or uncooperative norms-via an influence process.
Linking this influence process to the earlier discussion of how proselfs and prosocials respond to the acquisition of leadership implies divergent collective outcomes, depending on leaders' social value orientation. Specifically, if leaders have disproportionate influence on the behaviors of rank-and-file members, and prosocial leaders contribute more to the group upon ascending to leadership, it follows that rank-and-file members led by a prosocial will also contribute more to group goals (influence effect, figure 1 ). On the other hand, members of proself-led groups can be expected to make less cooperative choices. Returning to the previous example, if a prosocial leader of a work group takes on a disproportionate share of the work toward a common goal, her subordinates may be influenced to match the leader's high effort level in subsequent cooperative tasks. In this way, prosocials' and proselfs' responses to leadership, and the subsequent influence their contributions have on the behaviors of rank-and-file members, will determine the extent to which groups with leaders succeed at collective action.
A Second Possible Route from Leaders' Behaviors to Group Outcomes
We have argued that leadership can generate divergent effects, since prosocials and proselfs will respond differently to the power that accrues to leaders (see also Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh 2001) . Further, we expect that these first-order effects of power on the powerholder will spark divergent collective outcomes via an influence effect. But it is also possible that these different group-level outcomes will emerge as a result of a second-order power effect, namely the differential exercise of power on the rank and file via sanctioning.
Specifically, the behavioral economics literature on sanctioning defines strong reciprocators as those who, compared to their more self-interested counterparts, contribute at high levels and punish others who fail to do so (Fehr and Gintis 2007) . This suggests that prosocials will punish low contributions at higher rates than will proselfs. That is, prosocial leaders will not only be more likely to contribute at higher levels after obtaining power (first-order power effects); they will also punish others who fail to cooperate at high rates (second-order power effects, figure 1) . Note, however, that some research runs counter to this strong reciprocity prediction. For instance, Ones and Putterman (2007) find evidence for individual differences in both contribution behavior and punishment strategies, noting that propensities to contribute and to punish are not perfectly correlated. More recent work has found that tendencies to cooperate and to punish others who do not cooperate are completely orthogonal (Eriksson et al. 2014) . In any case, although we primarily expect leaders to impact rank-and-file members' contributions via an influence process, we also assess these second-order power effects as a non-competing mechanism.
Hypotheses
As noted earlier, no prior work has examined whether giving a single group member the sole ability to sanction his or her group members will promote collective action. As a result, we do not know from existing work whether groups with leaders will fare better or worse than groups with a standard peer-sanctioning system in place. Nor do we know whether leaders promote collective action in the groups they belong to via power or influence processes. As described above, we expect that the social value orientation of the leader will moderate both leader behavior (hypothesis 1 below) and, more importantly, group-level outcomes (hypotheses 2-4 below). We describe these hypotheses in turn.
First, following Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh (2001), we predict that acquisition of a leadership position will accentuate prosocials' and proselfs' preexisting tendencies. That is, although we expect that prosocials will contribute more than proselfs in general (i.e., in their baseline contributions during rounds without sanctions), we expect that these differences will be significantly enhanced among prosocials and proselfs after they become leaders.
Hypothesis 1: Even after controlling for their baseline contributions in a series of rounds without sanctions: compared to proselfs, prosocials will contribute more to the group after receiving the leader position.
We have also argued that the leader's social value orientation will impact collective outcomes via an influence process-that is, non-leaders will be influenced by the leaders' behavior in particular when making their own decisions. Thus, if prosocials contribute at higher levels after ascending to leadership positions, we predict that rank-and-file members of prosocial-led groups will also sacrifice more for the group. Likewise, if proselfs decrease their contributions in response to attaining leadership, the rank and file will also contribute less.
As noted above, research on strong reciprocity suggests that we should also observe second-order power effects, namely that prosocial leaders will be more likely to use punishment as a means of increasing contributions from the rank and file. While our main theoretical argument centers on the influence mechanism, our experiment also allows us to address this additional (non-competing) route from leaders' social value orientation to group contributions:
Hypothesis 2: Compared to groups led by proselfs, groups led by prosocials will contribute more to the public good.
Thus far, our hypotheses have focused on the relative advantages of prosocial versus proself leadership. Another aim is to compare the effectiveness of groups with leaders to the standard solution in the collective action literature, in which the power to sanction is distributed equally among all group members. We begin with contributions and then turn to earnings.
If proselfs reduce their contributions when they rise to leadership positions (and influence their group members to contribute less as well), we should expect proself-led groups to contribute less than members of groups with peer sanctions, where all group members have equal power and influence. Likewise, if prosocials increase their contributions when they become leaders (and influence their group members to contribute more), prosocial-led groups should contribute more than members of groups with peer sanctions. Thus, we expect contributions in the peer-punishment groups to fall between the high contributions of prosocial-led groups and the low contributions of proself-led groups:
Hypothesis 3a: Compared to peer-punishment groups, prosocial-led groups will contribute more to the public good.
Hypothesis 3b: Compared to peer-punishment groups, proself-led groups will contribute less to the public good.
Finally, consider earnings. As noted earlier, a fundamental drawback of peersanctioning systems is the difficulty of coordinating punishments and, relatedly, the loss of earnings from over-punishment and retaliatory counter-punishment. We expect that, after accounting for the welfare-destroying costs of sanctioning, peer-punishment groups will earn less than prosocial-led groups, where only one member can punish. We do not offer a prediction for how proself-led groups will compare to peer-punishment groups, as it is unclear whether proself-led groups' lower contributions (see hypotheses 1, 2, and 3b) but comparatively low sanctioning costs will be offset by the higher sanctioning costs but relatively high contributions in peer-sanctioning groups:
Hypothesis 4: After accounting for punishment costs, compared to peerpunishment groups, prosocial-led groups will earn more from the public good.
The following section outlines the experiment designed to test these hypotheses.
Methods

Participants and Design
Participants were recruited from introductory classes at a large public university in the southeastern United States; 312 participants (182 female) completed the study in exchange for payment. Each session was conducted in a group of four. All groups completed a standard repeated version of a public good game with no punishment ability (e.g., Sell and Wilson 1991; Willer 2009 ). Then, each group participated in additional rounds of the game under new rules, which varied by condition. In two conditions, only one participant (in one condition, a prosocial; in the other, a proself) could punish his or her group members. We refer to these conditions as the prosocial leader and proself leader conditions, respectively. In the third condition, all group members were able to punish (the peer-punishment condition). This condition, where all can punish all, is the standard one in the literature on sanctions in public good situations (e.g., Fehr and Gachter 2002; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992 ; for a review, see Shinada and Yamagishi [2007] ).
Procedure
Upon arrival to the lab, participants were escorted to a private room where they completed a consent form and the computerized task, programmed using z-Tree version 3.3.11 (Fischbacher 2007) . The task began with a series of pre-study questions, including a standard measure of social value orientation ( Van Lange et al. 1997 ; see the Supplementary Material online). 3 Aside from measuring participants' preferences for prosocial or proself outcomes, we also used scores on the social value orientation (SVO) scale to assign the leader in the two leader conditions, as described below. At no point during the study were participants told that the SVO scale would be used to determine who would occupy the leader role.
After everyone completed the pre-study questionnaire, the computer advanced to instructions for a standard public good game without punishment. The description of the task began by stating that while participants would be working in a group with three others, at no point would they see or meet the other group members. After assuring participants of their anonymity, they read through the instructions and several examples for an "investment decision task." The instructions explained that the participant and each of three others would independently decide how much of their 20-point endowments to contribute to a group fund, and how much they would keep for themselves. Points contributed to the group fund were doubled and redistributed equally to all group members. Thus, groups were presented with a standard public good dilemma (see the Supplementary Material online for the full study instructions). Participants then answered quiz questions to ensure their comprehension. The vast majority of participants answered all quiz questions correctly.
The public good task began after the quiz. Each participant entered a whole number from zero to 20 to indicate how much they wished to contribute to the group fund. After all participants had answered, everyone was able to see their own contribution and earnings, as well as the contributions and earnings of each other group member. Once everyone finished reviewing the results, the study proceeded to the next round, where participants again decided how much of a 20-point endowment to contribute to the group. This process was repeated for a total of six rounds. (Participants were not told in advance how many rounds they would complete.)
Once the sixth round was completed, a new set of instructions explained that some of the rules of the investment decision task would now change. The description of these new rules varied by condition: either peer punishment or leader. Instructions for the two leader conditions-prosocial leader and proself leaderwere identical. (To avoid demand effects, at no point in the instructions was the participant given the leader role referred to as the "leader.") In the peer-punishment condition, participants were told they could deduct points from each of their group members following each round; it cost 1 point to deduct 3 points from another group member. In the leader condition, only one (ostensibly randomly chosen) group member would be able to do so (see the Supplementary Material online). As in the no-punishment portion of the study, participants read through several examples and completed quiz questions.
We used scores on the SVO measure to select the leader. In the proself leader condition, the group member with the fewest number of prosocial answers (i.e., a high number of proself answers) was assigned to the leader role. In the prosocial leader condition, the group member with the most prosocial answers was assigned to the leader position. In case of a tie, the leader was chosen randomly from among the most prosocial (prosocial leader condition) or most proself (proself leader condition) individuals. All participants in the leader conditions were told whether or not they had been assigned to the leader position-and if not, the ID number of the participant who had (ostensibly randomly) received the leader role-before advancing to the punishment phase.
The rounds with punishment began similarly to the rounds without punishment. All group members made simultaneous contribution decisions and then viewed the results, including each group member's contribution and earnings. Then, leaders were again shown each other group member's contribution and earnings. Below that information, they indicated whether (and if so, how much) they wished to deduct from each person's earnings. For the peer-punishment condition, each participant viewed an identical screen and made deduction decisions. Then, all group members could view their and others' outcomes after deductions-including how many deductions they had received and their final earnings for the round. In the peer-punishment condition, participants could see the ID numbers of who punished whom. This process was repeated for six rounds. As in the no-punishment portion of the study, participants were not told the number of rounds in advance.
Once the public good task was completed, participants were paid based on their earnings (ranging from $10 to $15) and debriefed. Each session lasted about 45 minutes.
Results
Analyses were based on 72 groups of four, or 288 participants. 4 Groups were fairly evenly distributed across the prosocial leader (25), proself leader (22), and peer-punishment (25) conditions. Because data were nested (rounds within participants within groups), analyses employed multilevel models.
Preliminary Analyses: Contributions, Non-Punishment Rounds
All groups completed six non-punishment rounds at the beginning of the study. Since the instructions and procedures for this phase of the study were identical across conditions, we should not observe differences in contributions between conditions in the non-punishment phase. Any differences would suggest a failure of random assignment, and perhaps that differences in the punishment rounds were not due to effects of leadership but to preexisting differences between groups. As shown in table 1 (model 1), there were no significant differences in contributions between conditions in the non-punishment phase (ps > .8). There was an effect of round: within the six rounds where punishment was not possible, contributions declined significantly over time (p < .001) (see non-punishment rounds, figure 2). The degeneration of contributions over time is a standard finding in the literature (e.g., Ostrom 2000; Sell and Wilson 1991) and is one of the key problems for groups facing collective action situations. Peer sanctioning is the standard solution proffered by the literature for avoiding this spiral of noncooperation and maintaining high levels of contributions over time (Fehr and Gachter 2002) .
Change in Contributions, Non-Punishment to Punishment Rounds
How did the introduction of sanctions impact contributions to the public good? A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed that group-level contributions increased significantly from the final round of the non-punishment phase to the initial round of the punishment phase in all three conditions (ps < .03). Group-level contributions in the first round of the punishment phase did not differ by condition (p > .3). These results suggest that the introduction of each type of sanctioning system immediately increased contributions to the public good, and at similar levels, before the leader (or all group members, in the peer-punishment condition) had a chance to sanction. 5 We now turn to our first hypothesis, examining changes in individual-level behavior after the introduction of sanctions-and, for the leaders, after receiving the leadership position. To do so, we examined how condition and leader status impacted the difference in contributions between the six rounds where punishment was possible and the six rounds where it was not (table 1, model 2). This model allows us to assess whether leaders' contributions changed in the rounds in which they had the sole ability to punish their group members, and how nonleaders' contributions changed as well. (Because these models contain variables for leadership status, they are based only on the 47 groups in the two leader conditions; peer-punishment groups were omitted from these analyses and are discussed below.)
Results revealed a main effect of condition: those in proself-led groups contributed less in the punishment rounds, compared to those in prosocial-led groups (p = .04). The main effect was qualified by a significant condition x leader status interaction: proself leaders, in particular, contributed less in the six punishment rounds than they did in the six non-punishment rounds (p = .03, see figure 3 ). While proself leaders contributed an average of 10.0 points less than they contributed before they became leaders, prosocials contributed, on average, 4.0 points more when they became leaders. The findings lend support to the person x situation approach, and hypothesis 1: although proselfs who received the leadership role decreased their contributions to the group, we observed the opposite pattern for prosocials.
The significant main effect of condition in model 2 supports hypothesis 2: it suggests that non-leaders in proself-led groups also contributed less during the six punishment rounds, compared to non-leaders in prosocial-led groups (see figure 3) . That is, proself leaders, and their followers, actually gave less than they had when there was no sanctioning system at all, while prosocial leaders and their followers gave more. The next section more closely examines the mechanisms through which contributions to groups in these two conditions diverged.
Do Leaders Impact Contributions from the Rank and File via Influence, Power, or Both?
Thus far, we have shown that even after controlling for their baseline tendencies during non-punishment rounds, proselfs decrease their contributions further when they become leaders. Further, non-leaders' contributions fell in line with their respective leaders' contributions, suggesting the predicted influence process. To formally test this prediction, we assess whether leaders' contribution decisions in a previous round predict our dependent variable, non-leaders' contributions in the current round. We also address the possibility that group members did not favor leaders, but instead used the behavior of all group members in the previous round (i.e., both leaders and non-leaders) when making their contribution decision. Further, it is possible that group members were not responding to leaders' contribution behaviors in the previous round, but rather to leaders' use of punishment in the previous round, when they made their own contribution choices. To ensure that leaders' contributions in particular influenced non-leaders' contribution decisions, we included two additional predictors: average contribution of the other two rank-and-file members in the previous round and leaders' expenditure on punishment of the three rank-and-file members in the previous round.
Not surprisingly, this model (table 1, model 3) revealed a significant effect of other non-leader group members' contributions in the previous round on own contribution decision in the current round (p = .04) and of leaders' use of punishment in the previous round on their own contribution decision in the current round (p = .04). However, as expected, the effect of the leaders' previous contribution on non-leaders' contribution in the current round was highly significant (p < .001), suggesting that participants used the leaders' own contribution behavior as a cue for how much to contribute. There was no interaction with condition (p = .8); thus, although the prosocial and proself leaders tended to lead their groups in opposite directions, the magnitude of their influence was similar.
A mediation analysis revealed that the group-level contribution difference between conditions was fully mediated by the leaders' influence (see figure 4) . Although condition significantly predicted contributions in a given round (p < .05), and condition significantly predicted leaders' contribution in the previous round (p < .001), the effect of condition on contributions became non-significant after controlling for leaders' behavior in the previous round. This suggests that the group-level differences in contributions found in model 2 were driven largely by the effect of the leader, specifically, the leaders' influence on the rank and file's own contribution patterns. The foregoing analyses show that leaders' contributions had a significant influence on non-leaders' subsequent contributions. And because prosocial leaders, but not proself leaders, contributed at high levels after ascending to the leadership position, the rank and file contributed at higher levels and prosocial-led groups as a whole were better off. Did leaders differ in their exercise of power-that is, their use of punishment? Figure 5 shows that prosocial and proself leaders did not differ in how much they punished (p > .7). Moreover, the average contribution of those who were subsequently punished (and the average contribution of those who were not subsequently punished) did not differ by leader type (p = .35)-the average punished person contributed, on average, 4.2 points to the group in the proself leader condition and 4.9 points to the group in the prosocial leader condition. (We discuss the models and results on the use of punishment further in the Punishment section below.) However, as described above, prosocial and proself leaders did not contribute to the group equally, even though they tended to punish equally. This suggests that proself leaders frequently engaged in hypocritical punishment (Heckathorn 1990; Helbing et al. 2014 )-that is, punishing rank-and-file members who contributed as much, or more than, they themselves had. Indeed, of the instances where a rank-and-file group member was punished by a proself leader, the target of punishment had contributed as much or more than the leader 73 percent of the time. The opposite pattern was observed for prosocials-in 70 percent of the instances where they punished, it was directed at someone who contributed less than the leader (figure 6). Similarly, although the average individual punished by both a prosocial and a proself contributed about 4-5 points, as noted above, prosocials who punished at least one other group member had contributed, on average, 10.1 points; proselfs who punished, on the other hand, had contributed 3.0 points-less than the average amount (4.2 points) for which they were punishing others.
How Does Leadership Compare to Peer Sanctioning?
We now compare groups in the standard peer-sanctioning condition with leader groups to test hypothesis 3: did public good provision differ by type of sanctioning system? As noted above, contributions in the first round (i.e., before sanctions took place) did not differ by condition. However, contribution patterns by condition diverged substantially across the six rounds (see punishment rounds, figure 2 ). Specifically, model 4 (table 1) shows a condition x round interaction: consistent with the individual-level analyses described above, proself-led groups contributed less over the six punishment rounds, compared to prosocial-led groups (p < .01). Thus, as already suggested and in line with hypothesis 2, prosocial-led groups produced a larger public good than proself-led groups. As described above, this was driven by both leaders and non-leaders in the proselfled groups contributing less than leaders and non-leaders in prosocial-led groups.
We also expect (hypothesis 3a) that prosocial-led groups will be more effective than groups where sanctioning power is equally distributed to all group members. Consistent with this hypothesis, model 4 shows that peer-punishment groups contributed less over time than prosocial-led groups (p < .05). That is, although both types of groups initially contributed at higher levels under a sanctioning system than they had under no sanctioning system at all, groups with prosocial leaders were more successful than the standard sanctioning system at maintaining high contributions over time. Proself-led groups contributed somewhat less over time than peer-punishment groups, but the difference was not significant (p = .27). The findings, then, support hypothesis 3a: prosocial-led groups were more successful at public good production than the peer-punishment groups. Hypothesis 3b, that proself-led groups would be worse off than Contributed as much as or more than leader Contributed less than leader peer-punishment groups, was not supported. Rather, peer-sanctioning groups fared no better than groups led by proselfs.
Punishment
That contributions in prosocial-led groups were higher than those in peer-punishment groups is noteworthy given that the risk of being sanctioned, and the amount that one could be sanctioned, was three times higher in peer-punishment groups. Each member of peer-punishment groups risked being punished by three others; in groups with leadership structures, rank-and-file members risked being punished only by the leader and leaders could not be punished at all. Indeed, figure 5 and model 5 (table 1) show that those in peer-punishment systems were punished far more than those in either the prosocial-or proself-led groups (ps < .001), even controlling for how much they contributed, which was itself a significant predictor of punishment (p < .001). On the other hand, prosocialand proself-led group members were punished to a similar extent, as already noted. These findings on punishment are important for two reasons. First, the increased contributions we observed over time in prosocial-led groups, compared to both proself-led and peer-punishment groups, cannot be explained by a failure to punish free-riding behavior in the latter conditions. Prosocial-led groups did not produce more of the public good than their proself-led counterparts because proself leaders failed to punish-rather, the two types of leaders did not differ in their punishment behavior. And although groups with prosocial leaders also maintained high contributions over time compared to peer-punishment groups, group members led by prosocials were punished significantly less than members of groups using peer punishment. Second, because a single person was responsible for administering sanctions in the leader conditions, those conditions resulted in far fewer welfare-destroying sanctions, compared to the standard peer-sanctioning solution. Even controlling for contributions, those in the peer-punishment condition were punished significantly more than those in groups with leaders.
Earnings, Punishment Rounds
Finally, we turn to differences in earnings, after accounting for punishment costs. Consistent with hypothesis 4, peer-punishment groups earned significantly less from the public good overall (p = .01), and significantly less over time (that is, there was a round x condition interaction, p = .03), compared to prosocial-led groups. Indeed, peer-punishment groups also earned less over time compared to members of proself-led groups (p = .05) ( figure 7 and table 1, model 6 ). On the one hand, perhaps this finding should not be surprising, given that members of peer-punishment groups could be punished up to three times as much as lay members of groups with leaders. On the other hand, the results are striking when we consider that peer sanctioning is the standard solution in the behavioral economics literature. Peer-punishment groups yielded similar contribution rates, and significantly lower earnings, than groups led by proselfs-who contributed at low levels, influenced others to do so, and punished hypocritically.
Discussion
We have argued that appointing a single group member to leadership would impact both leader behaviors and group outcomes via power and influence processes. Specifically, following Chen et al. (2001) , we expected (hypothesis 1) that the acquisition of power would magnify baseline tendencies such that proself individuals become even more self-oriented (and thus contribute even less), while prosocials become more group-oriented (and thus contribute more), upon obtaining a leadership position (first-order power effect, figure 1 ).
More importantly, we expected that leaders' contribution behaviors would shape group-level contribution norms-and ultimately, group outcomes-via an influence effect (figure 1). We also asked whether prosocial and proself leaders produce different group-level outcomes via differences in their exercise of punishment (second-order power effect, figure 1). Although prosocial and proself leaders punished at similar levels, proselfs tended to engage in hypocritical punishment, punishing those who contributed as much or more than they themselves had. In sum, we have shown that leadership structures can sustain cooperation in collective action groups. But consistent with hypotheses 2-4, the benefits of leadership accrued mainly to groups with prosocial leaders: these groups both contributed more to the public good over time, and earned more, than groups with proself leaders or with the standard peer-sanctioning system.
These arguments and findings have a number of important implications for understanding collective action. As noted earlier, previous work has suggested that while peer-sanctioning systems can increase cooperative behavior, they have important drawbacks. We found that a prosocial leader given sole sanctioning ability increases contributions significantly more than the standard solution while avoiding those problems. For instance, while peer-sanctioning systems can result in over-punishment, results from our experiment show that leadership structures greatly reduce that risk. Just as importantly, while groups with prosocial leaders fared substantially better than all other groups, even groups led by proselfs came to earn more than those with peer-sanctioning systems in place. This is a remarkable finding given that peer sanctioning is the most prominent solution to collective action problems in behavioral economics (for a review, see Fehr and Gintis [2007] ). That members of peer-sanctioning groups contributed no more-and earned less-than groups led by proselfs (who decreased their contributions upon becoming leaders and sanctioned fellow group members hypocritically) suggests we should rethink the status of peer sanctioning as a favored solution to collective action problems.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although the arguments and findings presented here advance our understanding of when and why leadership promotes collective action, like any study, this one leaves open questions that should be addressed in future research. For instance, we studied a limited conception of power, rooted in the ability of leaders to punish rank-and-file members. But this is only one way that leaders can exercise power, and future research might consider others, for example, leaders who can also administer rewards.
Similarly, to compare the effectiveness of prosocial versus proself leaders, we appointed members to leadership. But leaders of real-world groups are often selected by their members. Thus, one important question is whether (and how) real-world groups tend to select group-beneficial, that is, prosocial, leaders. Although some research is suggestive (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck 2002) , we know of no prior work that directly answers this question. We thus conducted an ancillary study to preliminarily address whether people facing a collective action problem, like in the study reported above, would select prosocials as leaders.
The study, conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (see Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014) , presented respondents with the actual contribution decisions made in the non-punishment phase for two randomly selected groups from our study reported above. (More details of this study are available in the Supplementary Material online.) Participants read a brief description of both the original task and how the rules would change for subsequent rounds-that is, that one group member would be able to make deductions from his or her group members' earnings. They then selected which group member they would prefer to be appointed to the role; the majority preferred the highest contributor for the leadership position in both scenarios (ps < .001). 6 That is, in both scenarios, participants selected the group member who was most cooperative to be the leader. And in both scenarios, the most cooperative group member had been categorized as prosocial. Thus, prosocials were preferred for positions of leadership, and if given the opportunity to select the leader, participants would have selected a prosocial.
Importantly, however, participants in our follow-up study had direct evidence of group members' prosociality. That is, it was relatively straightforward for them to distinguish who was prosocial (those who were sacrificing for the group) and select on that basis. But such direct evidence of group members' prosociality is not always available. And leaders might be selected based on other qualities that may-or may not-be related to prosociality, including informal status (Willer 2009) or greater access to resources (Przepiorka and Diekmann 2013) . It is therefore possible that self-regarding types will end up as leaders. What, if any, mechanisms might lead them to act in ways that benefit the groups they lead?
One possibility is that election to leadership positions may encourage more group-oriented behaviors from proselfs. People prefer elected to appointed leaders ( Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999) , and cooperation is enhanced when a leader is elected rather than randomly assigned (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012) . Part of the reason is that elected leaders are perceived as more legitimate (Walker and Zelditch 1993) . Aside from followers' preferences, election to the position might enhance leaders' sense of responsibility toward their group, minimizing differences we would otherwise observe between more group-regarding and self-regarding leaders.
A variety of other factors might encourage proself leaders to act in ways that enhance group goals (or, for that matter, lead prosocial leaders to behave more self-interestedly). Indeed, in real-world groups, a mix of prosocial and proself motives may be operative. For instance, prior work finds that proselfs are nearly as cooperative as prosocials when cooperation results in reputational benefits (Simpson and Willer 2008) . Future work should consider how proselfs' greater reputational concerns and, as discussed below, the prospect of losing leadership positions, might attenuate the person x situation effects we observed above.
The study reported above is a first investigation into the dynamics and relative effectiveness of two very different solutions to collective action problems: the standard solution, which distributes the power to punish equally among peers, and a system that centralizes punishment in the hands of a single leader internal to the group. As a first step, our research treated peer punishment and leadership as mutually exclusive systems, but real-world groups are often characterized by combinations of formal or "top down" sanctions and informal norms among peers, systems that can work together or in opposition (Kitts 2006; Nee and Ingram 1998 ). An important next step would be to extend our work to address the joint effects of these two systems. For instance, it seems likely that the greater personal sacrifice of prosocial leaders and the tendency for them to punish rankand-file members who contributed substantially less than they themselves had would have led to the emergence of informal norms among rank-and-file members that complement the "formal" sanctions administered by the leader. On the other hand, the tendency for proself leaders to hypocritically punish rank-and-file members who contributed more than the leader himself had contributed would be more apt to generate oppositional norms, characterized by disapproval or punishment of peers who contributed "too much" to the collective good.
Relatedly, in the groups we investigated, leaders faced no risk of being sanctioned, regardless of their behaviors. But rank-and-file members of real-world groups may direct sanctions not only at one another but also at leaders. For instance, group members often can-and sometimes do-act together to oust ineffectual leaders. The potential for loss of leadership positions, or the prospect that informal norms can emerge in opposition to a leader's goals, may moderate the effects of power, encouraging more effective and group-oriented leadership even from proselfs. How such factors alter the dynamics of leadership and collective action could be addressed in straightforward extensions of the theory and experiment presented above.
Conclusion
We have asked whether a leader, given the sole responsibility for sanctioning others, can maintain cooperation in groups facing collective action problems. On the one hand, leaders prevent some of the key problems associated with peer sanctions, including over-punishment and earnings losses. Yet, some research on power suggests that the enhanced power that comes along with leadership positions might lead to self-serving, rather than group-oriented, behavior. From this perspective, it might seem puzzling that leadership is so ubiquitous in real-world collective action groups.
But we proposed and found evidence for a person x situation approach to leadership that helps shed light on this puzzle. Social value orientation moderates the impact of leadership on both leaders' behaviors and group-level outcomes. Other-regarding (prosocial) leaders contribute more to the group after ascending to leadership, while self-regarding (proself) leaders decrease their contributions even further. Further, we found that leaders' behaviors have large downstream effects on contributions from the rank and file. As a result, prosocial-led groups as a whole were substantially more productive than proself-led groups, pointing to the importance of putting power and influence in the right hands.
We also found that prosocial leaders were more effective in maintaining contributions than the standard peer-sanctioning system, where the power to punish others is distributed equally among all group members. More surprisingly, although proself leaders decreased their contributions substantially after receiving leadership, and influenced the rank and file to contribute less as well, peersanctioning groups did not outperform them in public good production. In fact, after accounting for the detrimental costs of punishments, peer-sanctioning groups fared worse than groups with self-regarding leaders. These results cast doubt on the viability of solutions that rely on peer sanctions, suggesting instead that prosocial leadership promises a more effective solution to collective action problems.
Notes
1. Of course, other types of sanctioning systems are possible. For example, giving sole punishment ability to a group leader is one form of centralized sanctioning, but pool punishment, where group members invest in a formal institution that punishes according to predetermined rules, is another (e.g., Yamagishi 1986 ). Moreover, groups are often characterized by multiple forms or sources of sanctions. For instance, in any given group, formal rewards and sanctions may be administered by a group leader, while informal rewards and sanctions (e.g., peer pressure or disapproval) flow between rank-and-file members (Kitts 2006; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007) . 2. That is, our goal was to conduct a first investigation of the dynamics and effectiveness of "pure" leadership systems versus "pure" peer-sanctioning systems. We therefore do not empirically address how the two systems interact. This is a critical question for future work, as discussed later.
3. Following past work, we combined individualists and competitors into one "proself" category (Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 1997) . As is standard in the social value orientation literature (Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 1997 ), a participant was classified as a given social value type when he or she answered at least six of nine items consistently. Of the 288 participants included in analyses, 119 (42 percent) were classified as prosocial, 143 (49 percent) as proself, and 26 (9.2 percent) could not be classified. 4. We omitted six groups-four in the prosocial leader and two in the proself leader conditions-from analyses because no group member qualified as prosocial or proself, respectively. In the leadership conditions, the experimental software selected the individual with the highest prosocial or proself score to be leader, depending on the condition. In three groups, this resulted in a participant who could not be classified as either prosocial or proself becoming leader. In the remaining three cases, a proself was assigned to lead a group originally designated as a prosocial leader condition. After omitting these groups, the mean number of prosocial responses for those categorized as proself leaders could range from 0 to 3 (M = .36); for prosocial leaders, the number of prosocial responses could range from 6 to 9 (M = 8.76). 5. We also considered whether, as a result of selecting the most prosocial (or proself) group member for the leadership position, the SVOs of the remaining group members (i.e., the rank and file) were unevenly distributed across conditions. However, a chisquare test revealed that non-leader group members' SVOs were distributed approximately equally across the prosocial and proself leader conditions, p = .25. 6. Participants in the Mechanical Turk study were not given information about group members' SVO. Rather, they viewed contribution decisions in the non-punishment rounds. Consistent with past work (see Balliet, Parks, and Joireman 2009) , in the experimental study, participants' SVO significantly predicted contributions in the non-punishment rounds (p < .01). Prosocials tended to contribute more than proselfs.
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